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SUMMARY
Canada’s declining position in the Global Competitiveness Index, the lower 
productivity of Canadian companies compared to U.S. firms and the low ranking 
of Canadian companies in the Global Innovation Index, despite the strengths of 
our scientific community and the quality of its scientific research, suggest that 
Canadians have not mastered the alchemy of transforming “knowledge into money.”
Key drivers of such a transformation in industrialized economies are high-growth 
and globally competitive technology companies. These so-called “gazelles” 
contribute disproportionally to job creation, economic growth, innovation and 
productivity improvement.2 Canada underperforms in the creation of these firms, 
and recent trends are not promising.
The expansion of Canadian companies into global markets is commonly suggested 
to be hampered by two main factors: (a) a lack of management skills, experience 
and talent, and (b) the propensity of Canadians to be risk-averse. Although these 
factors have undoubtedly hindered the potential of many companies, they have 
not been limiting factors for many others who have earned and maintained a 
leading position in global markets. Comparisons of manufacturing management 
practices between countries show that Canada’s performance is equivalent to 
1 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of Dentons Canada.
2 David Birch introduced the term “gazelles” in his seminal work The Job Generation Process to 
describe fast-growing companies. Typically, these companies with sales of at least $US1 million 
have maintained an annual growth rate of 20 percent or more in each of the past four years.
1that of leading countries, including Germany, Sweden and Japan. Today, sales of Canadian 
companies by foreign affiliates exceed Canada’s total exports, which is equivalent to almost 
30 per cent of GDP. Clearly, success in global markets is not an elusive goal for Canadian 
entrepreneurs and business executives.
Similarly, the assertion that Canadians are risk-averse needs to be tempered by the fact that 
Canadians invest billions of dollars in junior mining and oil and gas exploration companies, 
two of the most risky business sectors.
Experience, supported by extensive empirical evidence, confirms that Canadian policies to 
improve Canada’s competitiveness have so far been ineffective; more of the same will not 
yield better results. Access to external equity capital is a necessary condition for fuelling 
and sustaining the accelerated growth and success of high-growth, knowledge-based 
companies. Since 2017, globally, venture investments in the technology sector have been 
characterized by a decline in the number of deals, particularly in early-stage funding, but an 
increase in later-stage deals and the size of funding rounds. Rather than serving to deepen 
the Canadian public and private equity markets, current tax policies penalize high-growth 
technology firms that go public, and are biased in favour of private financing, a source of 
equity that has a propensity to “exit” by selling off stakes in promising young Canadian 
companies to foreign companies or investment funds rather than supporting their growth 
and scaling-up in Canada.
We suggest three policy avenues that combined would assist Canadian companies in 
expanding their activities in Canada and abroad to become part of the next generation of 
international leaders and help retain in Canada high growth firms that are acquired by non-
local businesses. In this vein, we propose that the Canadian (and provincial) governments 
adopt the following measures:
• Address the shortage of highly qualified and experienced personnel by promoting 
and financing the establishment of an institutional professional-network 
infrastructure similar to that of the German “Steinbeis.”
• Promote the acquisition and commercialization of intellectual property from 
domestic and foreign organizations by adopting, as 15 OECD member countries 
have already done, the so-called "intellectual property box" tax measure, which 
provides for a reduced rate of income tax on the commercialization of intellectual 
property developed or acquired by a Canadian company. 
• Support the scaling-up of Canadian businesses and increase the depth of equity 
capital markets through the adoption of targeted tax measures that: (a) eliminate 
the taxation bias that discriminates and penalizes innovative and high-growth 
Canadian companies that go public; (b) exempt from taxation the capital gains 
realized on the sale of the shares of certain small businesses held for at least five 
consecutive years prior to sale, similar to the measure adopted under the U.S. 
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010; and (c) provide for a gradual reduction in the tax 
on capital gains of eligible SMEs when they list on a Canadian stock exchange and 
are held by individual investors for a reasonable period of time afterwards.
•
2“Canadians are ingenious. Innovative both by nature and because of it, they have 
given the world a staggering array of tools, techniques, devices, solutions, machines, 
therapies, processes, and social innovations to help people live better, fuller lives.”
Johnston and Jenkins (2017)
The recent report by an expert panel at the Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) (2018) 
on the state of science, technology and industrial R&D in Canada provides an authoritative 
assessment of where Canada stands relative to our major competitors. The CCA report 
reveals that Canada remains strong in several fields of research; the recent Nobel awards 
in widely different domains of physics to Canadians Arthur B. McDonald (2015) and Donna 
Strickland (2018) and the granting of the 2019 A.M. Turing Award to Canadian computer 
scientists Yoshua Bengio and Geoffrey Hinton provide ample support for this assessment. 
More generally, Canadian scientists are highly regarded; their average citation rank is above 
the world average in all fields, and Canada stands in fourth place in terms of research 
reputation. Of particular concern, however, is that compared to other OECD countries:
• R&D intensity in Canada has declined steadily since 2001, whereas across OECD 
countries, R&D spending relative to GDP has continued to increase. Our gross 
domestic expenditures on R&D as a share of GDP stands at 1.7 per cent compared 
to four per cent for leading OECD countries and 2.4 per cent on average for OECD 
countries.
• The level of business R&D (BERD) in Canada is low — 33rd of 40 OECD and other 
leading countries — and there has been a sustained erosion in Canada’s industrial 
R&D capacity and competitiveness.
• Canada has comparatively low research output in core areas of natural sciences 
and engineering and particularly in enabling and strategic technologies. 
Clearly, Canada is punching well below its potential in critical areas, an underperformance 
that has enormous economic and social implications.
First, there is mounting evidence that “ideas are getting harder to find” as research 
productivity declines rapidly. In the United States, research productivity is estimated to 
fall at an average rate of 5.1 per cent per annum (Bloom et al. 2016). This means that the 
research effort must double every 13 years to maintain the status quo. This phenomenon 
is observed in all areas of research endeavour. For example, computer chip manufacturers 
note that it takes 18 times more researchers than in the early 1970s to achieve Moore’s Law, 
which entails doubling the density of computer chips every two years.3 Canada’s increased 
research effort falls short of the trajectory needed to offset its declining productivity.
At the global level, the impact of the decline in research productivity on overall economic 
growth is not as acute because, as expounded by Paul Romer (1990, 2019), ideas are 
non-rival; they differ from all other goods in that they do not get depleted when used by 
more and more people. Increasingly, they travel unhindered around the world suggesting 
3 As of 2019, 14 nanometer and 10 nanometer process chips are commonly in mass production, with 7 
nanometer process chips in mass production by TSMC and Samsung, although their 7 nanometer node 
definition is similar to Intel’s 10 nanometer process which has begun to be delivered in large volumes in June 
2019, a two-year delay on the original schedule (Company announcements). See also Flamm (2017).
3that the level of global connectedness will increasingly become critical for sustained 
competitiveness. The increasing pace of technology adoption is reflected in the reduction 
in the average time to adopt new technologies: It took about 65 years for telephones to 
reach 40-per-cent penetration of U.S. households, while smartphones reached this level 
in just 10 years. A major factor behind the accelerating rate of technology adoption is that 
modern communication and digital technologies require less infrastructure than the cable 
lines, electricity grids and telephone wires that had to be installed throughout the 20th 
century, which caused delays in the accumulation of network effects that make the products 
worthwhile for consumers. As a result, to remain competitive, firms must move much faster 
to innovate and adopt new technologies (digital and others) and best practices.
Second, and more specifically for Canada, the CCA report suggests that while Canadians 
are proficient in translating “money into knowledge” (i.e., Canada’s performance in 
measures of research results and impact is high), they do not appear to master the alchemy 
of transforming “knowledge into money.” Since the very essence of business innovation is 
the creation of new forms of value-added products, processes and business models, this 
gap is seen as a factor in the continued decline of Canada’s relative global competitiveness 
(Table 1) (Gu and Willox 2018).4
TABLE 1 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Country 2018–19 rank 2014–15 rank 2009–10 rank
United States 1 3 2
Singapore 2 2 3
Germany 3 4 7
Switzerland 4 1 1
Japan 5 6 8
Netherlands 6 5 10
Hong Kong 7 7 11
United Kingdom 8 10 13
Sweden 9 9 4
Denmark 10 12 5
Finland 11 8 6
Canada 12 13 9
Taiwan 13 15 12
Australia 14 21 15
South Korea 15 26 19
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum.
4 Canada’s position vis-à-vis the United States has been gradually improving during the 2010-2016 period as 
business productivity in Canada has grown significantly faster that in the United States (1.05 per cent per 
annum versus 0.51 per cent). 
4Both dimensions of technology diffusion need to be considered. First, there is technological 
adoption, the time it takes a new technology to first reach a country or company. Second, 
there is technological penetration, the extent to which technology reshapes processes 
and products in a company or country. There are strong indications that Canadian 
businesses are lagging behind their European and American counterparts in the adoption 
of new technologies (MNP 2018). The speed at which new technologies are adopted is an 
important determinant of productivity growth. Canada’s low proportion of machinery and 
equipment (M&E) investment as a share of GDP relative to its peers exacerbates the impact 
of the shortfall in BERD and innovation as the latest technologies are generally embedded 
in M&E.
The skittishness vis-à-vis innovation and technological advances is likely much more 
profound than what can be drawn from the CCA report because the report does not 
address nor take into account the overall knowledge advances and technological spillovers 
that flow from R&D performed by our major trading partners (Baumol 2010). There is 
strong evidence that trade liberalization, notably between Canada and the United States, 
accelerates the flow of technology across borders (Hsieh, Klenow and Nath 2019). It is 
estimated that the average value of a dollar of U.S. R&D in relation to Canadian productivity 
represents 78 per cent of the value of a dollar spent domestically on R&D (Keller 2001) With 
U.S. R&D expenditures being about 40 times larger than Canada’s effort, the impact of U.S. 
technology spillovers is expected to be much greater for Canadian productivity growth than 
that of Canada, assuming we have the knowledge to master these “imported” scientific and 
technological advances and the ability to translate them into our own innovations.
A good example of the importance of this diffusion mechanism is the adoption by 
Bombardier of the supercritical wing technology developed by NASA. This new technology 
has enabled Bombardier to develop a state-of-the-art family of wide-cabin executive jets 
with superior take-off and landing performance that fly further and faster on less fuel, all 
key performance characteristics that ensure the success of the company’s Global Express 
program and the billions of dollars in export sales that result. The latest addition to the 
family, the Global 7500, received its certification from Transport Canada in September 
2018. This aircraft, the largest and longest-range business jet on the market, is sold out 
through 2022.
While the CCA’s expert panel was unable to explain the gap between Canada’s research 
strength and innovation weakness, the so-called paradox (Council of Canadian Academies 
2013),5 it makes an important and useful point in stating that “many factors commonly 
identified as areas of concern do not adequately explain Canada’s overall weak innovation 
performance relative to other countries.” (Council of Canadian Academies 2018) 
Canada is not alone in facing this quandary. Across OECD countries, the relationship 
between GDP per capita growth and a country’s investment in R&D is tenuous. In a major 
study on sources of growth, the OECD found no statistically significant effect of public 
R&D expenditure on growth (OECD 2003). This should not be totally unexpected. While 
R&D aims to increase the stock of knowledge and the use of this knowledge to devise new 
5 A similar gap has been observed in the European Union — the “EU paradox” — since the mid 1990s (Global 
Innovation Index 2018).
5applications, innovation goes far beyond R&D to reach users, suppliers and consumers 
with new or significantly improved products, processes or organizational methods and 
practices. It differs from advancements in knowledge and breakthroughs in science, 
technology and the arts as it must become embedded in production or business processes 
and requires acceptance by the market, not only recognition by peers.
FIGURE 1 GROWTH AND R&D INVESTMENT
Investment in R&D vs. GDP/capital growth 
(OECD ex-Eastern Europe, 1990-2012)
 
Investment in R&D as per cent of GDP 
Source: OECD statistics; Oliver Wyman.
Examination of the MIT Technology Review’s 50 Smartest Companies list for the years 2015–
17 reveals that no Canadian companies had the “impressive combination of technological 
leadership and business acumen” to make the cut. The problem is that, overall, Canadian 
companies are not innovative, ranking 18th on the Global Innovation Index. 
A successful innovation is not the product of a “random walk,” but the result of a managed 
process. For most firms, innovative developments are more incremental than revolutionary 
in their nature and impact. Peter Drucker asserts that “above all, innovation is work rather 
than genius. It requires knowledge. It often requires ingenuity, and it requires focus” to 
ensure their integration into the company’s operations (Drucker 2002). Hence, the central 
role of entrepreneurs and management. 
To a large extent, innovation is not a problem of ideas. The findings of a survey of CEOs 
and CIOs of large corporations about the impact of innovation units leave little doubt 
that generating ideas is less of a problem than implementing them. Despite significant 
investments in innovation, only 23 per cent of companies said that their innovation units 
had delivered a significant innovation — defined as one that accounts for more than 10 per 
cent of the business revenue (Prats et al. 2018).
6Most people have a natural bias against new and creative ideas in times of uncertainly 
(Burkus 2013). This attitude and the failure it entails in recognizing “good” ideas is the root 
cause of many past corporate blunders that gave competitors the opening to seize the 
technological lead. Well-known examples include Kodak’s invention of the digital camera 
in 1975; Sony developed a different prototype and conquered the market. Xerox developed 
the first personal computer, but its failure to invest sufficiently in the technology allowed 
Apple to conquer a large part of the market. Closer to home, the early dismissal of the 
threat Apple’s iPhone posed to the Blackberry because “it has no keyboard,” and failure 
to anticipate the consumerization revolution the iPhone portended, is another example. 
Nokia made the same mistake of underestimating the attractiveness of the iPhone design 
and the Apple App Store to consumers worldwide. The success of innovations, particularly 
revolutionary ones, hinge on the ability to recognize unmet (even unknown) market needs 
and understand the deeply rooted factors of perceptions and behaviours that are relevant 
to an attractive product. Google’s failure to create a viable market for its Google glasses 
was an inability to understand the motivations that would lead mainstream consumers to 
ascribe a status symbol to wearing the glasses.
February 2019 gave us another example of a strategic error with enormous financial 
consequences rooted in a lack of recognition of the factors driving consumer preferences. 
The Airbus A380, a high-tech aircraft marvel designed to carry from 550 to more than 800 
passengers, and to make high-density connections between airport hubs more economical, 
was ended. The decision to launch the A380 program gave little weight to the fact that 
airline travelers abhor the need to make connections to reach their destination. Boeing, 
which was more attentive to passenger preferences, launched the Boeing 787 Dreamliner at 
about the same time. This smaller, long-range aircraft allowed airlines to effectively bypass 
hubs by offering direct flights from a significant number of middle-sized cities. By February 
2019, Airbus had received only 313 orders (often at a considerable discount) for the A380 
compared to 1,421 orders for the B787 Dreamliner, which is considered a commercial 
success.
Two important lessons emerge from the above stories about business innovations. First, the 
failures did not stem from technological deficiencies — in most cases, they were stunning 
technological advancements — but from lapses in management practices and savvy and 
from organizational hubris. The examples clearly show that innovation is about solving for 
both technical and market risks. Second, all were well-established companies with smart 
people. While it is more satisfying to celebrate success, the tendency to denigrate and vilify 
Canadian companies that make missteps is unhealthy, making recovery much more difficult 
and unnecessarily undermining their resilience.
Before addressing the so-called “paradox,” the two pseudo-profound ideas that have been 
advanced as the root causes that hinder the expansion of Canadian companies in global 
markets need to be put to rest. They are: (a) the lack of managerial skills, experience and 
talent (Herman and Marion 2016); and (b) Canadians’ propensity to be risk-averse. There 
is no doubt that these factors have hampered the potential of many companies. These are 
problems that seem particularly acute in sectors such as life sciences and medical devices 
where, despite Canada’s international leadership in health research, it has failed to grow 
Canadian companies with the reach and scope necessary to anchor a technology cluster 
7(Advisory Council on Economic Growth 2017). However, they have not been limiting factors 
for many others.6 
Contrary to what is often asserted, the fact is that many Canadian companies do not shy 
away from expanding into foreign markets (Mandel-Campbell 2007). Between 2010 and 
2018, Canadian-based companies acquired, in part or in full, 7,821 companies abroad 
(Figure 2) (Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances 2019). Today, sales by foreign 
affiliates owned by Canadian interests exceed Canada’s total exports, equivalent to almost 
30 per cent of GDP (Poloz 2016).
FIGURE 2 NUMBER AND VALUE OF M&A TRANSACTIONS IN AND OUT OF CANADA
(number and value 2010–18, US$)
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Source: Thompson Financials, Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA).
The large and expanding footprint of Canadian-owned companies abroad is a real sign that 
they are productive and growing while creating jobs in Canada in areas such as research 
and development, engineering, design, sales and marketing. They are also developing 
Canadian executives with international expertise, along with the professionals that advise 
them. How many Americans, and Canadians for that matter, know that the Citi Field 
stadium (home to the New York Mets), the Yankee Stadium in New York, the Mercedes-
Benz Stadium in Atlanta (home to the Falcons), the new roof of the Arthur Ashe tennis 
stadium in New York and many other stadiums across North America are the products of 
6 Regardless of what one may think of the high valuation of Canadian cannabis producers, the fact remains that 
their very rapid expansion in Canada and abroad to establish an unbeatable lead in foreign markets if and 
when recreational marijuana becomes legal, puts to rest the idea that Canada does not have the management 
skills to develop businesses and take commercial risks. The question of whether the hype that fuels the frenzy 
will morph into sustained growth for these companies is another question, which only time can answer. (The 
Economist, 2018 (c))
8a Canadian company: Canam Group? The same question can be asked about the Mario 
M. Cuomo Bridge, which replaces the Tappan Zee Bridge over the Hudson River in New 
York, the new Goethals Bridge over New Jersey and Staten Island in New York City, or 
the replacement of the deck sections of the Brooklyn Bridge, made possible by the use of 
orthotropic steel deck panels, a technology mastered by Canam and just a few other North 
American steel fabricators. 
The global standing of the Canadian companies profiled in the next section demonstrates 
that success in world markets is not an elusive goal for Canadian entrepreneurs and 
business executives.
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
• In the automotive industry, Magna International (market value: $22.5 billion),7 
headquartered in Aurora, Ont., is a global automotive supplier with 168,000 employees 
in 321 manufacturing facilities and engineering centres in 29 countries. On March 18, 
2018, Magna announced that it will be Lyft’s exclusive supplier of high-tech kits that 
convert vehicles into self-driving cars. Another automotive and industrial leading 
manufacturer is Linamar ($3.3 billion) of Guelph, Ont., a global leader in powertrain 
system solutions and aerial work platforms.
• CGI Inc. ($21.7 billion), a Montreal-based global information technology, consulting, 
systems integration, outsourcing and solutions company, is one of the five largest 
independent business-process and IT-services companies in the world. With offices in 
40 countries, it employs approximately 70,000 people.
• In the aerospace industry, we have Bombardier ($4.6 billion), a world leader in business 
aircraft and passenger rail and mass-transit systems, with engineering and production 
sites in 28 countries. CAE ($7.5 billion) is the world leader in aircraft training simulators 
and Héroux-Devtek ($461 million) is the third largest global manufacturer of landing 
gear, activators and components, supplying both the commercial and military sectors 
of the aerospace industry. These three companies are headquartered in Montreal. Until 
its merger with Digital Globe in October 2017 to form Maxar Technologies Ltd., MDA 
of Vancouver was one of the world’s leading satellite communication companies.8 It is 
notable that aerospace manufacturing is among the largest and most R&D-intensive 
industries of the Canadian economy (Council of Canadian Academies 2018, 85 and 
99-100) and that in a country comparison, Canada ranks first in civil-flight-simulator 
production, second in business aircraft and third in civil aircraft and civil engine 
products.
• In engineering design, procurement and construction management, WSP Global Inc. 
($7.0 billion), headquartered in Montreal, is present in 40 countries and is one of the 
7 The numbers in parenthesis indicate the market capitalization of each company at the close of trading on the 
TSX on Feb. 1st, 2019.
8 Notes of interest: Héroux-Devtek was responsible for the design and manufacturing of the landing gear for 
the Apollo Lunar Module that placed Neil Armstrong on the moon as part of the Apollo 11 mission, while 
MDA’s most visible products include the Canadarm used on NASA’s Space Shuttle, and the Canadarm 2 and 
Dextre remote manipulator systems used on the International Space Station. (company reports)
9largest professional services firms in the world. SNC-Lavalin ($6.4 billion), also based 
in Montreal, with offices in 50 countries and operations in more than 160 countries, 
is consistently ranked among the best engineering firms in the world and recognized 
as a world leader in the design and engineering of nuclear power plants. Stantec Inc. 
($3.6 billion), based in Edmonton, is ranked among the world’s top 10 global design 
firms. With approximately 70 offices worldwide, Hatch Ltd., based in Mississauga, 
Ont., is recognized as a world leader in process design, engineering and project and 
construction management by leading companies in the mining and metals, energy and 
infrastructure sectors.
• OpenText ($13.1 billion) is a leader in enterprise information management systems. 
Headquartered in Waterloo, Ont., it is Canada’s largest software company with more 
than 10,000 employees worldwide. 
• In power sports vehicles and propulsion systems, BRP ($4.0 billion) based in Valcourt, 
Que. is an undisputed world leader in the design, manufacturing, distribution and 
marketing of motorized recreational products.
• Celestica ($1.5 billion), headquartered in Toronto, is a leader in design, manufacturing 
and supply-chain solutions, and is ranked by Thompson Reuters as one of the top 100 
global tech leaders.
The CCA report suggests that “a lack of managerial talent and experience in growing 
technology firms to scale is a critical impediment in Canada.” The above companies, with 
thousands of engineers and science graduates in their employ, must be recognized for 
what they are: true world-leading engineering design and technology companies and a 
high-value subset of “advanced industries.” 
Innovation is a multi-form phenomenon that bears mainly on improvements to existing 
products, processes and business models (Miller and Côté 2012). From Canada’s 
economic point of view, having companies in global leadership positions is what matters. 
Alimentation Couche-Tard ($40.2 billion) is a good example: in less than 30 years, it has 
grown from its Québec roots into the largest convenience-store operator in the world. With 
an international network of close to 10,000 stores and retail sales in excess of $60 billion, it 
ranks among the 25 largest retailers worldwide. Its market capitalization now exceeds that 
of Loblaw Companies, considered to be the nation’s largest retailer ($23.8 billion).
And if we look at more recent company vintage, what about AGT Food and Ingredients Inc. 
($95 million), a Regina-based global leader in pulse and staple food processing with fully 
integrated facilities in seven countries serving customers in over 120 countries? Canada 
is not known to be a world leader in the fashion and clothing industry, yet we now have 
Canada Goose Holdings ($7.6 billion) a Toronto-based designer, manufacturer, distributor 
and retailer of winter clothing for men, women and children, whose products are widely 
available in high-end retail stores around the world.
Pollard Banknote ($612 million) is a leading expert in instant tickets with proprietary 
technology to leverage social and mobile media in this space and is a preferred supplier 
to more than 50 lotteries worldwide from its base in Winnipeg. Montreal-based Stingray 
Digital ($377 million) is a world-leading provider of multiplatform music services, 
competing successfully with Spotify, Apple Music and Google Play, with 400-million 
10
households in 156 countries worldwide having access to Stingray’s channels. Its recent 
acquisition of DJ-Matic, a provider of in-store media solution in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Denmark, adds 78,000 European locations to its already extensive network.
Shopify (US$24 billion), is an Ottawa-based company that provides its own e-commerce 
platform for online stores and retail point-of-sale systems and is Amazon’s go-to solution 
for merchants looking to create custom e-commerce websites. Kinaxis ($2 billion), also in 
Ottawa, provides sophisticated supply-chain management, sales and operation-planning 
software to global organizations. And Montreal-based Lightspeed ($1.7 billion), which 
completed its initial public offering (IPO) in March 2019, is a software company that 
provides point-of sale and omnichannel transaction processing, as well as the management 
of inventory, sales and analytics 
It is not pure coincidence that all the Canadian champions mentioned above, with the 
exception of Hatch, are public companies, a dimension that is not addressed in the CCA 
report. We will return to this later.
As we point to these examples of global leadership, some rebuttals come to mind: Yes, but 
what about Northern Telecom, a Canadian champion that failed? What about Research in 
Motion, which fell hard from its peak, having once dominated the mobile device market? 
What about Bombardier or SNC-Lavalin’s recent troubles?
Global markets are treacherous. The impermanence of corporate excellence is well 
documented: A survey of 404 companies in 15 industries over 30 years found that just one 
out of 10 companies that exceed the growth of their industry in any given year was able to 
repeat that performance every year for a decade (Baghai, Coley and White 1999). Hence, 
we cannot expect clear sailing decade after decade. Indeed, in recent years, we have seen, 
for example, Kodak disappear; the demise of Motorola, the pioneer of mobile phones; 
the break-up of Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and subsequent merger of the parts into Nokia9 and 
China’s Huaxin; General Motors and Chrysler being saved from bankruptcy by government 
bailouts; IBM undergoing a major turnaround under Lou Gerstner; Hewlett Packard 
Enterprise stumbling for years under a string of outsider CEOs; and, in recent months, 
General Electric being expelled from the Dow Jones Industrial Average after 111 years, to be 
replaced by a retailer. Canadian global companies are not immune from the vicissitudes of 
global markets. Thomas J. Watson’s observation that “it is harder to keep a business great 
than it is to build it”10 tells us why we must nurture and encourage the growth of a large 
number of potential future champions.
THE RISK-AVERSION SYNDROME
The assertion that Canadian businesses are failing to grow because Canadians are risk-
averse reflects a misconception about the Canadian economy. For instance, very few 
business sectors are more risky than mineral exploration. Canada is well known for the high 
9 In the process, Nokia acquired Bell Laboratories, one of the largest R&D facilities in the communications 
industry. It holds in excess of 29,000 patents. (Nokia, 2016)
10 Thomas J. Watson Jr., chairman of IBM, 1963.
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participation rate of junior companies in this sector of activity, which generally have no 
operating revenues and depend on equity financing. Even though they tend to be small and 
flexible and tend to specialize in high-risk, early-stage exploration activities, they account 
for almost half of annual mineral exploration expenditures in Canada.
As at Dec. 31, 2018, the 1,090 junior mining, oil-and-gas and energy-services companies 
listed on the TSX Venture Exchange had a market value of $21.2 billion. Three-quarters 
(75 per cent) of Canadian oil and gas companies listed on a Canadian stock exchange 
are active in exploration, production and service activities abroad, with an international 
presence in more than 90 countries (Larson 2018).
As a rule, the management teams in these companies consist of engineers, geologists, 
geophysicists and graduates in environmental sciences, often with a master’s or Ph.D. 
degree. The nature of their activities and their success at home and abroad clearly 
demonstrate the unique contribution of universities to innovation and economic growth 
through the training of talented people in fields of advanced knowledge who can integrate 
it into processes and products.
TABLE 2 MINING AND OIL AND GAS COMPANIES ON A CANADIAN EXCHANGE
TSX Venture TSX
Mining
Number of Issuers 971 218
Quoted Market Value ($ billion) 17.3 253.9
Oil and Gas
Number of Issuers 971 218
Quoted Market Value ($ billion) 17.3 253.9
Source: TMX MIG Report, Dec. 31, 2018.
In the mining sector, Canadian companies providing the mining industry with geological, 
engineering, legal and capital-markets financing services are regarded as among the best 
in the world. Vancouver is home to the world’s largest cluster of exploration companies 
and Toronto is recognized as a global hub for mining and mineral-exploration financing and 
legal services. 
Lack of knowledge of a company or industry increases perceived risks for good reasons. 
Mining and oil and gas companies account for 46 per cent of the companies listed on 
a Canadian exchange (and 20 per cent of the quoted market value, or QMV), while 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) companies represent only six per 
cent of the number and four per cent of the QMV of the companies listed on a Canadian 
exchange. In the U.S., the weight of the information technology sector accounts for 21 per 
cent of the S&P 500 whereas it is only 3.8 per cent of the S&P/TSX composite index. The 
consequences of the low weighting on Canadian stock exchanges of high-tech companies 
(ICT, life sciences, industrials, clean techs) compared to U.S. markets are numerous 
(Table 3). They include too few analysts and less expertise in assessing the value of these 
Canadian companies, which leads to investor disinterest and lower valuations compared 
to American companies with comparable parameters. For investors, especially individual 
12
investors who have neither the resources nor the time to study these high-tech companies, 
their reluctance is not a matter of “risk-aversion” but sound investment discipline. You don’t 
put your savings in things you don’t know or for which you can’t get informed professional 
advice. While investors cannot be blamed for their rational behaviour, the resulting 
downward valuations are a serious handicap for most Canadian small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in high-tech; with few exceptions, they are saddled with a discounted 
currency for acquisition purposes and are sitting ducks for aggressive U.S. and other 
foreign companies.
TABLE 3 SECTOR WEIGHTS OF S&P/TSX 60 AND S&P 400 MIDCAP INDEXES
S&P/TSX 60 Equal
Weight Index (%)
S&P400
Midcap Index (%)*
Energy 25,45 4,0
Materials 18,08 6,8
Industrials 6,53 15,5
Consumer Discretionary 9,88 11,7
Consumer Staples 8,42 2,9
Health Care 3,71 9,2
Financials 16,51 16,7
Information Technology 3,13 15,4
Telecommunication 4,95 2,5
Utilities 3,34 5,4
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC.
* Based on GICS® sectors.
Concerns about the risk-aversion to small technology companies by Canadian governments 
and established companies are not entirely unjustified. For instance, we do not have within 
the federal government’s apparatus the equivalent of DARPA and demand-driven sectoral 
support, such as “open innovation” and “incentive prizes” approaches that are common 
in the United States and Europe, which are proving increasingly effective in achieving 
strategic objectives in various government agencies and programs while stimulating 
technology-enabled innovations. Technology company entrepreneurs lament that large 
Canadian companies are reluctant to participate in the commercial launch of new products, 
forcing them to go abroad, where large companies are more receptive. 
This attitude is well illustrated by the sales history of Bombardier’s CRJ aircraft. At the 
time, the regional jet was a revolutionary concept not only because of its technological 
dimension, but also because it went against the airline industry’s mantra that profitability 
was directly related to seat-mile cost, while the CRJ had the highest cost per seat-mile of 
any available commercial aircraft (the CRJ’s competitive advantage was to provide the 
lowest cost per trip). The launch customer in 1992 was Lufthansa, quickly followed by 
Comair, a U.S. regional airline. Subsequently, SkyWest (U.S.) and Air France’s affiliates, Air 
Littoral and Brit Air, became CRJ operators, setting the CRJ on the path to become the 
most successful Canadian commercial aircraft program. Even though its head office was 
adjacent to Bombardier’s CRJ assembly plant, it was only in 1995 that Air Canada acquired 
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the aircraft. Notably, two experienced American airline executives were at the helm when 
Air Canada placed its first order for the aircraft (Hollis L. Harris as chairman, president and 
CEO and R. Lamar Durrett, as COO).
REVVING UP THE ENGINES OF GROWTH
The understanding of job-creation mechanisms took a decisive turn in 1979 with the 
publication of David Birch’s seminal work, The Job Generation Process (1979), about which 
companies created new jobs and where they were created. Since then, it has been generally 
assumed that about two-thirds of new jobs are created by SMEs. That is not the whole 
story, however. Subsequent studies based on more comprehensive longitudinal databases 
have made it possible to refine the analysis and better identify the sources of job creation. 
The main conclusions from these studies cast a more balanced light on this complex reality 
and identify the growth engines:
• Most people who start a company are doing so for “lifestyle” reasons. Most have little 
desire to grow big or to innovate, as their decision for starting a business is primarily 
driven by their desire for non-pecuniary benefits (being one’s own boss, flexibility of 
hours, etc.). Survey results of early-stage entrepreneurs show that very few intend to 
bring a new idea to market. Instead, most are oriented toward local markets where it 
is easier for the owners to provide an existing service to an existing customer base. 
Because they respond to local demand, their contribution to the increase in collective 
wealth is marginal. Only a minority of them will grow larger than 20 permanent jobs. 
These findings suggest “that the importance of entrepreneurial talent, entrepreneurial 
luck, and financial frictions in explaining the firm size distribution may be overstated.” 
(Hurst and Pugsley 2011) 
• Younger firms have a lower probability of survival, but those that do survive grow faster 
than older firms (Klette 2002).
• A minority of companies (between four per cent and seven per cent of the total) are 
responsible for creating most net jobs. Birch calls these “gazelles.” In 2012, based 
on the OECD-Eurostat methodology, the number of high-growth enterprises in 
Canada represented 4.4 per cent of all SMEs having between 10 and 250 employees 
(Government of Canada 2017b). Between 2000 and 2009, high-growth firms accounted 
for 85 per cent of total job creation in Canada (Government of Canada 2014). Similarly, 
in the United States, between 2000 and 2006, high-growth or “dynamic” companies 
created 84 per cent of net jobs (Acs, Parsons and Tracy 2008).
• Dynamic companies can be small, medium or large. They are found in various regions 
throughout the country and are present in all industries. As reflected in the composition 
of the S&P Midcap 400, they are not concentrated in high-tech sectors (Table 3). They 
are generally quite successful exporters. Between 1993 and 2002, high-growth export 
companies created 47 per cent of jobs even though they accounted for only 5.5 per 
cent of Canadian companies (Government of Canada 2008).
14
The results of productivity and innovation studies are consistent with these observations.
• Dynamic companies post the highest productivity-growth rates (Leung, Meh and Terajima 
2008). This is because they generally use the most advanced technologies and displace 
less-productive companies. Their ability to convert R&D results, whether internally or 
externally generated, into genuine commercial innovations is a key success factor.
• The productivity level of companies is a function of their size. This positive correlation 
between company size and productivity applies to all sectors. In Canada, it has been 
observed that companies with more than 500 employees and those with 100 to 500 
employees have productivity levels that are 30-per-cent and 20-per-cent higher, 
respectively, than that of companies with fewer than 100 employees. This productivity 
gap also increases over time. It stems from the fact that productivity gains depend 
on the assimilation of expertise, competencies and best practices within companies 
and from their continuous adaptation. This process takes time. Think of the learning 
curve: the advances in productivity are a function of cumulative output, not cumulative 
investment (Lee and Tang 2001).
• Increases in productivity according to company size are linked to better capitalization. 
Indeed, productivity differences between exchange-listed companies of different sizes 
are much less pronounced.
• Most innovation takes the form of established firms improving their own products — 
quality improvements rather than the development of new and different products. This 
source of innovation accounts for about 65 per cent of economic growth (Garcia-Macia, 
Hsieh and Klenow 2017).
• R&D spending increases with company size. However, the data are less convincing with 
respect to the intensity of R&D, which is generally measured in terms of R&D spending 
per employee or as a function of revenue. In some industries, intensity grows with 
company size, while the opposite may occur in other cases. In any event, R&D entails 
major risks and requires a lot of capital — but it cannot be debt-financed, because of 
factors such as the intangible nature of the assets it uses and generates. 
• The way innovative activity is financed has profound consequences both for the 
direction of technological change and for the competitive dynamism of the economy 
(Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 2007). For instance, institutional ownership in publicly traded 
companies seems to be positively associated with their propensity to innovate and their 
sound governance of R&D (Aghion, Van Reenan and Zingales 2013).
MANAGEMENT MATTERS — A LOT
It is generally accepted that managerial talent is some combination of a sharp strategic 
mind, leadership ability, emotional maturity, communications skills, the ability to attract 
and inspire other talented people, entrepreneurial instincts, functional skills, and the 
ability to deliver results (Michaels, Jones and Axelrod 2001). Relatively rare, managerial 
talent is considered a key competitive resource because it shapes the fate of companies. 
For growing organizations, successfully managing growth initiatives at various stages of 
maturity adds another level of complexity, perhaps the most important challenge facing 
their leaders. So-called “blitzscaling” a company (extremely fast scaling-up) requires that 
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the management team be constantly evolving and CEOs must realize that their job is to 
make the company successful, not to do everything themselves. The senior team must 
mutate from “everyone is a doer” to “most people are doers” to “managers of doers” to 
“managers of managers.” The ability to implement this continuous evolution, to recruit the 
best people and to attract and retain exceptional talent on board, is critical for success.
While a certain part of “good management” eludes description, ways have been 
developed to assess and measure core managerial practices; they show that their adoption 
accounts for a large fraction of performance differences across firms and countries and 
that well-managed firms outperform on the key dimensions of growth, productivity, 
profitability and market value. The findings of a massive national survey covering 35,000 
U.S. manufacturing plants demonstrate that management matters a lot for company 
performance and that good management practices are more important than the adoption 
of technology for company performance and success (Bloom et al. 2017). These results 
were confirmed by a major study based on the input from nearly 2 million employees and 
more than 300,000 business units. They found that managers’ performance explained a 
full 70 per cent of the variance in productivity between business units (Clifton and Harter 
2019). Another study covering 14,000 organizations in more than 30 countries reached 
similar conclusions. It also found that all countries and sectors were saddled with a large 
number of persistently badly managed firms — thus the importance of promoting high-
growth firms that force weaker firms to exit — and that foreign multinationals are better 
managed than domestic firms; in Canada, their average management score was about 
20-per-cent higher than that of domestic companies (Dowdy and Van Reenen 2014). The 
converse also holds: Canadian companies that have invested in facilities in other OECD 
countries show higher productivity growth than similar companies that remained domestic, 
as their foreign investments allowed them to benefit from learning and technological 
spillover effects (Rai, Suchanek and Bernier 2018). 
Canadian multinational companies and those seeking to penetrate foreign markets are 
enmeshed in a war to recruit and retain talented employees, much like their brethren 
elsewhere around the world. That Canada’s pool of talent has always been smaller in 
number than that of the U.S. is in the nature of things. However, in relative terms, the 
OECD reports that Canada’s international orientation as a proportion of GDP is almost 
double that of the United States (25 per cent versus 13 per cent) (OECD 2017),11 a sure 
sign that, heretofore, Canadian businesses had access to a significant pool of talented 
managers, executives and entrepreneurs. This is confirmed by a comparison of the scores 
across countries of manufacturing-management practices, showing that Canada’s score 
is relatively good by international standards, equivalent to that of leading countries, 
including Germany, Sweden and Japan. The only country with significantly better 
management practices is the United States (Bloom et al. 2012). It does not follow that 
Canadian companies cannot compete and win across the North American continent. The 
performance of Canadian National Railway demonstrates that Canadian managers can 
stand their own — even outperform — their American peers (Figure 3).
11 International orientation is a broad notion that captures the impact on national income of exports and sales 
through foreign affiliates.
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FIGURE 3 OPERATING MARGINS OF NORTH AMERICAN RAILROADS, 2002–17 
Note: Operating margin = 1 – (operating costs/operating revenues). CN and CP operating margin is for 
thefull system, not just U.S. subsidiaries.
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis.
The 2017–18 Global Competitiveness Report ranked Canada seventh for labour-market 
efficiency and third for the effective use of talent (Schwab 2017). This relatively positive 
assessment should not blind us to the huge challenges that confront us. Combined, the 
demographic shift, a deepening shortfall of knowledge and skilled workers and the growing 
mismatch between the skills needed and those available to master the large number of 
disruptive technologies that arise from the intensive use of digital technologies are likely to 
metastasize into an undeniable talent crisis that could jeopardize the capacity of Canadian 
companies to grow, innovate and sustain global competition. Already handicapped by a 
relatively small percentage of Canadians with advanced degrees in science and technology 
compared to its peers, Canada will need to replace the 95,000 experienced Canadian 
engineers that are expected to retire in the next seven years and further increase the 
total number of engineers to meet the growing demand. This is an issue with far-reaching 
consequences. The evidence is to the effect that productivity is high in manufacturing 
establishments with a higher proportion of scientists and engineers in operations and that 
it increases as the proportion rises, suggesting that the work of scientists and engineers 
in establishments producing goods and services is an important pathway for increasing 
productivity and earnings, separate and distinct from the work of scientists and engineers 
who perform R&D (Barth et al. 2017).
Confronted with this impending shortage of knowledge workers and talent, Canada 
should increase the proportion of immigrant intake through economic immigration 
and emulate Germany by establishing a network similar to that country’s “Steinbeis” 
system. The Steinbeis network groups around 6,000 technical professionals whose skills, 
experience and know-how can be put to use by companies across the country. It has 
proven to be very effective in helping German companies in their quest for technological 
leadership and innovation.
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It is undeniable that it has become an increasingly difficult challenge to fill management 
and C-suite positions, especially when performance is highly dependent on front-line 
experience. This scarcity of tested and proven management talent is a quandary common 
for fast-growing technology companies in all industrialized economies, as we are all 
affected by the same demographic shift. The situation in Canada could be exacerbated 
by the apparent inability of our academic institutions to meet the challenge and strive for 
excellence. Only three Canadian universities made the Financial Times Global 100 MBA 
Ranking 2019; they stood at the 85th, 87th and 94th place (Moules 2019; Council of Canadian 
Academies 2019).
STRONG HEADWINDS RISING
Two potent headwinds spurred by a substantial increase in concentration in key markets are 
likely to make it increasingly difficult to grow Canadian corporate champions on the global 
stage in the absence of fundamental changes in Canadian policies and practices towards 
high-growth companies.
Rising industry concentration in North America and Europe:
Since 2000, a significant increase in industry concentration has occurred in both 
manufacturing and non-financial services in Europe and North America, a rise in 
concentration that is not driven by digital-intensive sectors (Bajgar et al. 2019). In the 
United States, the average revenues of the top four firms in a given industry rose from 
24 per cent to 33 per cent of total industry revenues between 1997 and 2012. In Europe, 
the increase in industry concentration has been contained at about half the rise in North 
America. The result is that European continental markets now have lower concentration, 
lower excess profits, lower regulatory barriers to entry and are more competitive than U.S. 
markets (Gutiérrez and Philippon 2018).
Rising concentration in North American industry is creating conditions that are not 
favourable for high-growth SMEs, whether American or Canadian. Indeed, it has been 
observed that the increase in industry concentration and declining competition in the 
United States is largely responsible for the fact that the U.S. business sector has since 
the early 2000s under-invested in equipment and intangible assets such as R&D and 
innovation relative to profitability, valuation and funding costs (Gutiérrez and Philippon 
2017). This under-investment relative to their Tobin’s Q ratio (market value divided by asset-
replacement cost) has been accompanied by a decline in the number of high-growth firms 
and a lower propensity for young firms to be high-growth firms (Decker et al. 2016).
In Europe where industry concentration appears to have been better contained since 
2013, the number of European tech-company IPOs has been two-thirds higher than 
in the United States and their post-listing performance superior to that of U.S. tech 
companies (in 2018, an average gain of 222 per cent compared to 42 per cent for U.S. 
tech companies) (Atomico 2018).
18
In Canada, industrial concentration is historically high and greater than in the United 
States. As in the United States, there has been a broad-based decline in the dynamism of 
the economy, mainly as a result of a sustained decline in the entry and exit rates of new 
businesses, rates that have shrunk by half since the early 1980s. This was accompanied 
by a large decline in the share of “gazelles,” which is particularly worrisome (Leduc 2017). 
Part of the problem is the labour shortages faced by Canadian companies, particularly 
mid-size companies, that hinders their growth as they are forced to refuse orders or 
delay deliveries (BDC 2018). More fundamentally, Gutierrez and Philippon’s findings 
that increased industry concentration in the United States has led U.S. firms to under-
invest in equipment and intangible assets relative to their Tobin’s Q ratio suggest that 
the historically low level of business R&D and reluctance of large Canadian companies to 
deal with and support small, innovative firms may be related to the high level of industry 
concentration prevailing in Canada.
The problem is compounded for Canadian SMEs by the slower growth of exports and 
imports in global value chains. Trade boomed in the 1990s and early 2000s “in part 
because intermediate goods began globetrotting” (Blanchard and Posen 2016). Global 
value chains are now “mature” markets, making them increasingly challenging to penetrate. 
The rush to dominate the digital and artificial-intelligence sectors by the world’s 
tech titans:
The intrinsic nature of the new information economy, of the economics of networks and 
the non-linear scalability of digital-platform technologies lead to winner-take-all markets. 
Competition between the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent) Chinese titans and the 
American FAANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google’s parent, Alphabet) 
technology giants for dominance in emerging markets, combined with their drive to 
diversify into a wide range of product lines, significantly increases the barriers to entry 
and their ability to extract higher price markups (Lagarde 2019). As they rush to acquire 
startups to get the best talent and new data-analytics science, they build a “walled garden” 
around them to ensure that no rival can upend their business model. Spotify Technology 
S.A.’s antitrust complaint to the European Union that Apple Inc. was abusing its control 
over the applications that appear in its App Store is a case in point.
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FIGURE 4 THE “MENACING” MARCH OF TECH LEVIATHANS
The Market Power of “Superstar” Companies The M&A of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Number of AI tech-company  
acquisitions since 2010)
* Source: CB Insights; Fortune, July 2018.
This behaviour of the technology titans undermines innovation and startup activity. Several 
important venture capital firms have expressed a reluctance to support startups whose 
business could compete somehow with the BATs or FAANGs when they know they are 
most likely to be outbid by the tech giants or, if they were to invest, would find that their 
chosen firm becomes subject to predatory pricing that makes it unlikely to survive. And 
when venture capital (VC) firms do invest, they tend to direct the new entrepreneurs 
towards developments designed to complement the tech giants’ offerings and, thus, be an 
attractive candidate for takeover.12 
In North America, VCs are now openly talking of a “kill zone” around FAANGs, which do 
not hesitate to crush nascent competitors by copying or acquiring them early to eliminate 
a potential threat, as was illustrated in vivid detail in a recent U.K. House of Commons 
committee report (Government of the United Kingdom, 2019). The feeding frenzy is 
also observed in China where, between them, the BATs account for close to half of all 
domestic VC investments.13 The impact of the tech titans buying spree in North America 
is accentuated by open and stealth investments in tech firms by governments seeking to 
acquire state-of-the-art digital and artificial-intelligence (AI) technologies for strategic or 
military purposes. In the United States, the DIUx report reveals that China participated in 
more than 10 per cent of all venture deals in 2015 with a focus on early-stage innovation in 
AI, robotics, autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, financial technology, and gene-editing. 
Between 2015 and 2017, U.S. investors ranked first, with US$59 billion invested in U.S.-
based venture-backed companies, Europe was second with US$36 billion and China third, 
with US$24 billion (Brown and Singh 2018).
12 In the U.S., startups whose businesses centre on the consumer internet are shunned by VC firms because 
Google and Facebook are so dominant. (The Economist, 2018 (a))
13 Between January 2008 and May 2018, Tencent has made 57 investments in small technology and retail 
companies and Alibaba made 44 investments. (The Economist, 2018 (b))
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Not surprisingly, a study of the number of acquisitions and IPOs in OECD countries 
between 2007 and 2016 showed that in digital sectors such as software, data analytics, or 
digital services, acquisitions account for almost all successful VC exit events and that about 
90 per cent of the acquirers are public companies — both well-established and newly listed 
(Breschi, Lassébie and Menon 2018).
NURTURING GAZELLES
At a conference on the future of manufacturing in Canada organized by the Canadian 
Academy of Engineering (2013), a senior representative from Switzerland summarized the 
conditions and factors that explain how his country’s manufacturing sector has continued 
to prosper despite a very high cost base and how his country has been able to keep the 
first rank on the Global Competitiveness Index for nine consecutive years. He suggested 
that the main attributes that explain Swiss superior performance are world-class scientific 
research institutions, strong collaboration between academia and business, high business 
spending on R&D, on-the-job training opportunities, high productivity and, above all, close 
collaboration between manufacturing companies and other suppliers in the value chain 
within Switzerland. The whole focus was on the nature of collaborative practices and the 
strengths of the Swiss ecosystem as a social institution. Although no mention was made of 
the need or role of exceptionally experienced senior executives in scaling-up technology 
companies, it is worthy of note that around 25 per cent of the founders of Swiss innovative 
startups hold a Ph.D., compared to about 10 per cent in Canada. 
A similar conclusion emerges from AnnaLee Saxenian’s study of the factors that explain 
how and why Silicon Valley pulled ahead of Boston’s Route 128 region as the latter’s 
competitiveness began to wane in the 1980s (1996).
Saxenian shows that the Route 128 region was dominated by companies that internalized 
a wide range of productive activities. Practices of secrecy and loyalty governed the 
relationships between these companies, suppliers and competitors. They established 
boundaries between companies and between companies and local institutions, so that 
social and technical networks became largely internal to the company (i.e., information 
tended to flow vertically and trickle horizontally). Saxenian observed that in Silicon Valley, 
companies compete intensely with each other while learning from each other about market 
and technological developments through informal communications and collaborative 
practices. Loosely linked structures promote horizontal communication between the 
company’s divisions and with external suppliers and customers. Functional boundaries 
within companies are porous in the network-based system, as are boundaries between 
companies and between companies and local institutions, such as professional associations 
and universities. Over time, know-how and skills are developed and enriched, intimate 
knowledge of customer needs is internalized and high-value information is available at 
a low cost, coalescing into a self-sustaining strategic ecosystem and a vibrant cluster of 
related industries and academic institutions strong in the associated fields (Delgado, Porter 
and Stern 2014).
The bottom line is that accumulating the large volumes of knowledge and expertise 
necessary to fuel the rapid growth of companies and industries requires the networks that 
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possess that knowledge and expertise to continually evolve and adapt to their environment. 
Social institutions cannot be built by fiat nor can they be purchased lock, stock and 
barrel, since their bedrock is trust, a quality that needs to be cultivated and stimulated 
over enough time for human interrelations to grow. It follows that finding experienced 
entrepreneurs and executives is less challenging than assembling what is needed to foster a 
supportive ecosystem that encourages collaboration — both within company and institution 
walls and outside it — and nurtures a culture that values transparency, mutual support 
and agility. The record of such initiatives around the world suggests that the ability of 
governments to act as a catalyst to stimulate the entrepreneurial sector is limited (Lerner 
2012 a, b).
People who have held management positions in large foreign or Canadian companies 
where they have learned the ropes and gained the self-confidence necessary to compete 
and win globally are a common source of leadership talent. This is the case, for example, 
of Montreal-based Hopper, a mobile flight-booking platform that allows travellers to track 
airline ticket prices with up to 95-per-cent accuracy up to one year in advance and to book 
trips around the world. Its management team has acquired extensive experience in travel 
technology by working for Expedia and TripAdvisor. That has propelled Hopper to the 
forefront of mobile travel applications in North America. Based on the valuations used in 
recent funding rounds, Hopper may become one of the few Canadian unicorns in the digital 
space. Another example is Eddyfi, a Quebec City-based technological company specializing 
in the development of high-performance, non-destructive testing (NDT) equipment 
and software for surface inspection of critical components and assets in the nuclear, 
power generation, oil and gas, and aerospace industries around the world. The company 
recently acquired M2M, a French leader in the development and manufacturing of phased-
array ultrasonic testing instruments for NDT. Interestingly, two of the top five executives 
have worked at EXFO, a large Quebec City-based company active in the development, 
manufacturing and sale of network test instruments for fixed and mobile telecom networks 
worldwide, while two others have held management positions in American and Japanese 
multinational industrial companies.
Another pool of expertise is successful executives who have a proven track record and value 
the opportunity to partner with and mentor dynamic young entrepreneurs and help them 
succeed by passing on their knowledge, instilling discipline in the establishment of priorities, 
financial management and business practices and providing guidance for expansion in 
foreign markets. A case in point is the composition of the board of directors at Lightspeed 
POS, where the chairman is the former chief financial officer of OpenText, two other 
directors have held executive positions at Google and another was an executive at Amazon.
EQUITY CAPITAL IS ESSENTIAL TO GROWTH
If companies hope to grow quickly, they need plenty of equity capital. Few knowledge-
based and high-growth companies can sustain accelerated growth with internally 
generated funds. Securing outside equity capital is therefore an obligatory step to 
realize the company’s potential, an absolute condition of success. The two main and 
complementary sources of outside equity capital are private equity investors (VC and 
private equity firms) and public equity markets.
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Recent analyses of the performance of VC and non-VC financed firms in Canada and 
the United States show that the average performance of venture-capital-financed firms 
is significantly superior to that of comparable non-VC-backed firms on key metrics: (i) 
stronger revenue growth; (ii) sales growth; (iii) graduates headcount growth; (iv) asset 
and R&D-expenditures growth (Government of Canada 2013; Puri and Zarutskie 2012). 
In Canada, small dynamic firms that go public exhibit, on average, similar superior 
performance (Carpentier and Suret 2018).
Canada is relatively well positioned in terms of access to and availability of equity capital. 
Compared to some of its peer countries, venture capital flows have accelerated in recent 
years. Canada now ranks third, behind the United States and Israel, in terms of venture 
capital investment as a share of GDP (OECD 2017). The TSX Venture Exchange (TSX 
Venture) is one of the largest public venture markets in the world; it exhibits the world’s 
highest number of company graduation to the main exchange. Between 2013 and June 
2018, private equity firms completed deals valued at $131.3 billion across all important 
industry sectors. Private venture capital deals totalled $15 billion over this time frame. 
During this same period, companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) raised 
$269.9 billion and those on the TSX Venture $26.6 billion.
The large amount of public and private equity investments support the view that both 
public and private equity markets play a complementary role in the Canadian economy 
(Lortie 2019). They also support the contention of several large international bodies, 
including the World Bank and the European Commission, that public capital markets play 
a critical role through the provision of alternative funding sources for high-growth and 
innovative firms, and their recommendation to foster the development of junior markets, 
which serve as a stepping stone to a main stock exchange where more funding and liquidity 
are available (European Commission 2015; IOSCO 2015; Nassr and Wehinger 2016).
Unfortunately, the content of many Canadian official reports and the federal government 
policies that follow are biased in favour of private equity (PE). For instance, the CCA report 
addresses the growing VC flow of financing in Canada, indicating that there were 530 VC 
transactions totalling $3.2 billion in investments in 2016 (Council of Canadian Academies, 
2018). Curiously, it is silent about Canada’s public equity markets, as if they did not exist. 
Yet, in that same year, Canadian companies listed on the TSX Venture completed equity 
financings for a total of $4.4 billion in investments to which we should add four IPOs 
on the TSX, together worth another $1.5 billion (TMX 2016). Another case in point is the 
Venture Capital Catalyst Initiative proposed in the 2017 federal budget as a cornerstone of 
the government’s Innovation and Skills Plan (Government of Canada 2017a). This measure 
follows a recommendation of the Panel to Review Federal Support for R&D (the Jenkins 
report) (2011). The panel was silent on issues of access to public capital markets by 
startups, high-tech and high-growth SMEs and did not address Canadian government tax 
policies that penalize “gazelles” that go public.
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The federal government’s policies favouring PE over public equity suffer from four major 
intrinsic weaknesses that make them counterproductive.
• They penalize indiscriminately high-growth and dynamic SMEs. The federal income 
tax rate jumps from 10.5 to 15 per cent for a small company that goes public and 
the federal government’s 35-per-cent SR&ED tax credit for R&D performed by small 
companies shrinks to 15 per cent. In addition, when they are listed on an exchange, new 
technology-based companies are no longer eligible for a cash refund of the federal 
SR&ED tax credit; they must be content with almost worthless tax credits, since being in 
the investment phase, they are not yet, or are barely, profitable.14
• They are myopic. They implicitly assume that a PE investment equates to an IPO, 
regardless of the greater subsequent access to the diversified sources of equity 
financings available to listed companies. IPOs are the marginal part of the equation. 
Between 2010 and 2018, the proceeds of IPOs by TSX-listed companies and by TSX 
Venture-listed companies represented only 12 per cent and four per cent, respectively, 
of the total equity raised by these companies during that period (Lortie 2019).
• They fail to recognize that the depth of Canadian PE markets are shallow. On a GDP-
normalized basis, PE financings in excess of $50 million occur in Canada one-sixth 
and one-third as often as they occur in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
respectively. Because larger funds have a propensity to fund a firm over multiple 
rounds, thus providing greater funding continuity, their presence is key to scaling-up 
funding (Duruflé, Hellmann and Wilson 2017). As a result, Canadian firms that have 
reached the growth stage characterized by product maturity, rapid customer adoption 
and revenue growth are “orphans” under the current SME financing-policy. This critical 
issue is bound to become increasingly acute in the future. The past five years have seen 
a significant increase in large funding rounds, particularly mega-rounds (>$100 million), 
a reflection of the soaring cost of go-to-market strategies which are unlikely to abate 
(Oliver Wyman 2018).
• They destroy potential wealth creation by favouring a non-permanent source of external 
equity that has a propensity to sell dynamic, high-growth firms to foreign buyers which 
are then able to realize and capture their financial value.
GONE, GONE…GOODBYE
The Canadian junior capital market provides a “real-life” setting to perform an empirical 
analysis of the trajectory of growth-oriented SMEs, depending on whether they have 
chosen the private funding (PE and VC) or the public-market funding option. The data 
show that the exit path of choice for Canadian PE and VC firms is consistent with cross-
country observations that the number of trade sales is one order of magnitude higher 
14 The small-business corporate income tax rate applies to income earned by a Canadian-controlled private 
corporation (CCPC). In general, a corporation is a CPCC if the corporation is privately held, provided it is 
not controlled by one or more non-resident persons or a public corporation. The general corporate rate (15 
per cent) applies to active business income earned in excess of $500,000. A CCPC is eligible to claim the 
35-per-cent income tax credit rate (ITC) and related 100-per-cent ITC refund on current expenditures (up to 
an expenditure limit of $3 million) as long as prior-year taxable capital does not exceed $50 million or taxable 
income does not exceed $800,000 (on an associated group basis). Subsection 125 (7) (ITA)
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than the number of IPOs. In Canada, between 2013 and June 2018, PE and VC firms 
completed 609 exit transactions, 43 IPOs or reverse takeovers and 566 M&A transactions. 
(Lortie 2019) In view of the tendency of governments in Canada to assist in the funding 
of innovative startups through state-sponsored VC and PE firms, we should be under 
no illusion that “the fact that a start-up received government VC support instead of 
only private VC funding does not impact the probability of acquisition or IPO.” (Breschi, 
Stefano et al., 2018).And in Canada, this generally means that these new technology-based 
companies will be acquired by and subsumed within foreign companies based mainly 
in the U.S. These foreign trade sales are common and increasing in Canada. During the 
2001–12 period, 57 per cent of trade sales of Canadian dynamic SMEs resulted in migration 
(Carpentier and Suret 2014).
Table 4 summarizes the type of acquirers of the “top disclosed” VC and PE exits during the 
period 2016 to June 2018. It shows that nearly two-thirds of these major transactions were 
with a foreign buyer, often multinationals and leveraged buyout companies.
TABLE 4 TOP CANADIAN VC AND PE DISCLOSED EXITS
Top Disclosed VC Exits* Top Disclosed Canadian PE Exits
Year
Buyers
Value of 
Foreign 
Acquisitions 
(%)
Year
Buyers
Value of 
Foreign 
Acquisitions 
(%)
(nb) (nb)
Foreign Cdn Stock Exchange Foreign Cdn
Stock 
Exchange
2016 5 - - 100 2016 5 3 2 57
2017 6,5 0,5 2 78 2017 4,5 2,5 3 54
2018 
(H1) 2 - - 100
2018 
(H1) 3 - 2 89
Total 13,5 0,5 2 85 Total 12,5 5,5 7 69,7
Source: Schwanen et al. (2019)
Business ownership has considerable influence on the strategies a company pursues, the 
location of its critical functions, including R&D, and its integration into the business fabric 
and societal environment, an integration that hollowed-out companies cannot fulfill. It is 
unlikely that Canada will improve its low ranking in innovation and productivity growth 
among its OECD peers if it fails to develop more Canadian multinationals around which new 
technology companies can develop in symbiosis. Let’s face it: branch plants are inimical to 
dynamic ecosystems. For these social institutions to be able to breed, nurture and sustain 
companies capable of competing globally, the “body and mind” of entire companies — that 
is, all functions, including the CEO and his or her executive team — must contribute to and 
actively participate in the informal webs of communications that nourish their value. The 
fate of CGI Inc., contrasted with that of DMR Consulting Canada, is a reminder of this iron 
law. The two companies were once comparable on most dimensions, but took a different 
path in 1995; today, CGI Inc. is a global leader headquartered in Canada, while DMR has 
been subsumed into the global Fujitsu organization.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Canada faces perhaps no greater economic and social challenge than its struggle to 
increase its productivity. Recognized worldwide for the quality of its scientific research, it 
lags behind its peers in terms of business R&D levels, its openness to the adoption of new 
technologies and its innovativeness. While many Canadian companies operate abroad, the 
prevailing sentiment is that too few have achieved global standing in their industry.
If the Canadian government is serious about improving Canada’s performance in 
transforming technological innovation into wealth creation, it must adopt a new narrative 
that will inform both public debate and policy. Emphasis must be placed on expanding 
the activities of successful Canadian companies in Canada and abroad with the explicit 
objective of creating the next generation of international leaders. The focus needs to be 
centred on: the “gazelles” (i.e., high-growth transformational companies — large and small); 
the elimination of taxation rules, such as those that govern the federal SR&ED tax credit, 
which discriminate against high-growth and tech companies that go public and hinder their 
growth; the adoption of measures that will deepen the amount of long-term and permanent 
equity capital available for investment in high-growth and dynamic companies; and tax 
policies that promote the acquisition and commercialization of intellectual property and 
encourage and support entrepreneurs keen to build sizeable companies. 
Expanding the horizon
External openness across various dimensions of goods, services, capital, people and 
data is an important cross-border conduit for ideas, research, technologies, talent and 
best practices. Canada’s score of 17.3 on the MGI Connectedness Index is concerning, 
particularly when compared to the Netherlands (54.3), the United States (52.7), Germany 
(51.9), the United Kingdom (40.8) and China (34.2) (Manyika et al. 2016). In terms of 
innovation policy, the benefits of harnessing the results of R&D investments made by 
other advanced economies as well as China and India must be actively considered. The 
current approach to the analysis of the impact of R&D on innovation is too often based 
on an autarkic vision of the science and technology enterprise with the consequence that 
“the questions” are framed in a way that limits the examination of policies that could have 
significant and powerful effects. As a result, we rarely consider that “honourably adopting” 
ideas, knowledge advances and technological breakthroughs in other countries can be a 
very efficient way to stimulate innovation and improve the competitiveness of Canadian 
companies. Canada has a very effective and efficient export development agency, yet 
we do not have an agency with a clear mandate and the financial resources to support 
Canadian companies in scouting for and acquiring emerging technology and intellectual 
property abroad. Why not?
To further promote the acquisition and commercialization of intellectual property from 
domestic and foreign organizations, the so-called “intellectual property box,” tax measures 
should be adopted. Already implemented in 15 OECD member countries, the measure 
provides for a reduced rate of taxation on income arising from the commercialization 
of intellectual property, including patents, copyrights and process designs developed 
or acquired by a company (Lester and Warda 2018). Enacting such a preferential tax 
treatment at the federal and provincial levels would address two issues of concern: It 
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would make the hollowing-out of Canadian firms less attractive to foreign acquirers and, 
conversely, make the acquisition of intellectual property in Canada or abroad by Canadian 
companies more attractive. 
Human capital
The contribution of engineers and scientists to improving business productivity and 
profitability is well established. Canada is already at a disadvantage in this regard, 
which puts a premium on the “recruitment” of immigrants with those qualifications. The 
retirement en masse of experienced engineers in the coming years will worsen the situation, 
making the adoption of new technologies and innovation much more risky.
To address this shortage of highly qualified personnel, the Canadian government should 
take the lead in promoting and funding the establishment of an institutional infrastructure 
similar to the German Steinbeis system, a network of academics, technologists and 
engineering professionals. Its mission would be to provide companies across Canada with 
access to professionals with the skills, experience and know-how necessary to address 
technological, production, and commercial issues they face in their business.
CAPITAL DEEPENING
Targeted tax measures to improve Canada’s competitiveness and support the scaling-up of 
Canadian firms and their global expansion include:
• Elimination of the taxation bias that discriminates and penalizes innovative and high-
growth Canadian companies that go public.
• Adoption of a tax measure similar to the U.S. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 that 
provides for full exemption from federal taxation of capital gains realized on the sale of 
the shares of certain small businesses held for at least five years. The evidence suggests 
that in the U.S. this tax measure increased the amount of investment in investee firms 
per founding cycle as well as the number of investors (Lortie 2019).
• A gradual reduction of the capital gains tax rates on shares issued by qualified SMEs 
when they list on a Canadian stock exchange and are held by individual investors for 
a reasonable period of time afterwards. For example, the tax rate should be reduced 
by 50 per cent if the shares are held for more than 12 months, and should be zero if 
the shares are held for more than 36 months. Not only would this measure promote 
individual investor participation, but it would also improve the pricing of Canadian SME 
IPOs, increase market liquidity and improve the quality of these companies’ shares in 
the market.
To date, Canadian policies to improve Canada’s competitiveness have been ineffective. 
More of the same will not yield better results. There is ample evidence that capital gains 
taxes on shares and options hinder entrepreneurial activity (Edwards and Todtenhaupt 
2018), and reduce the supply of private equity (particularly for startups) and follow-up 
funding (Bock and Watzinger 2017). They also cause entrepreneurs to decrease innovation 
risk, to remain invested longer and, overall, to forgo growth (Dimitrova and Eswar 2019). 
Although the superior performance of Switzerland and Singapore cannot be fully attributed 
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to the fact that they do not levy capital gains tax on the sale of corporate shares by their 
residents, it should be noted that Switzerland ranked first among the most competitive 
economies in the world for nine consecutive years and Singapore is among the five most 
competitive economies on the Global Competitiveness Index. We recognize that such a 
radical policy change would be difficult to swallow. The measures proposed above, based 
on solid empirical evidence, are specifically targeted at those individuals and organizations 
best positioned to improve the productivity and competitiveness of Canadian businesses 
at home and abroad, and stimulate economic growth through increased investments in 
and commercialization of intellectual property and the expansion of high-growth Canadian 
firms into global markets.
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SLOW, SUBJECTIVE AND STRESSFUL: A GUIDE TO CANADA’S ASYLUM SYSTEM 
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Asylum-System-Falconer-Final.pdf
Robert Falconer | August 2019
REGULATING FINTECH IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: COMPARISON, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Fintech-Clements-final.pdf
Ryan Clements | August 2019
UNDERSTANDING CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Indigenous-Consultation-Boyd-Lorefice-final2.pdf
Brendan Boyd and Sophie Lorefice | August 2019
WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE CANADIAN OIL AND GAS COMPANIES? 2017
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Where-in-the-World-2017-Larson.pdf
Braeden Larson | July 2019
TRADE POLICY TRENDS: BREXIT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA-UK TRADE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Trade-Policy-Trends-Brexit-final.pdf
Dylan Klemen and Eugene Beaulieu | July 2019
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Financial-Supports-for-Refugees-and-Asylum-Seekers-FINAL-version.pdf
Robert Falconer | July 2019
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TRENDS: OUR PLANET IN 2040: COMPARING WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOKS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Energy-Trends-World-Energy-Outlooks-final-2.pdf
G. Kent Fellows, Victoria Goodday, Rabia Ladha, and Jennifer Winter | July 2019
HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY POLICY IN ALBERTA
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/History-of-Disability-Sonpal-Valias.pdf
Nilima Sonpal-Valias | July 2019
THE URBAN POLICY CONTEXT IN MEDIUM-SIZED EUROPEAN METROPOLITAN AREAS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mid-Sized-Cities-Barati-Stec.pdf
Izabella Barati-Stec | July 2019
TAX POLICY TRENDS: CORPORATE TAX POLICY: ALBERTA GOES ITS OWN WAY
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/TPT-June-AB-Corporate-Tax-METR.pdf
Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz | June 2019
